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In its very fi rst case, the Appeals Chamber of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) confronted the 
diffi culty of prosecuting the type of group activity that resulted in mass 
atrocities during the Yugoslav war. Strictly applying the principles for 
attributing criminal responsibility found in the ICTY Statute, the Trial 
Chamber had acquitted Tadić of the most serious charges he faced, the 
murders of fi ve individuals that occurred during the ethnic cleansing of 
the village of Jaškići. The Tadić Appeals Chamber remedied the pro-
blem by elaborating the doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), 
which it held was customary international law that was encompassed 
within the framework of ICTY Statute.
In two of its three forms – JCE I (shared intent) and JCE III (exten-
ded liability for reasonably foreseeable crimes) – JCE closely resem-
bles liability for substantive crimes committed during the course of a 
conspiracy. So-called Pinkerton liability has its roots in a case decided 
by the United States Supreme Court in 1946, and although the Appeals 
Chamber in Tadić did not rely on specifi cally on Pinkerton as a source 
for its holding, the similarities between the two cases are plain.
The purpose of this article, and the lecture on which it was based, is 
two compare the two doctrines to determine how they assign criminal 
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liability and which one better comports with the principle of culpabi-
lity; that is, punishing a criminal defendant appropriately based upon 
his mental state (mens rea) at the time the crime was committed. The 
conclusions reached were mixed.
It appears that Pinkerton attributes liability more broadly to non-
-par ticipating defendants in some cases of shared intent than does JCE 
I. This is because a defendant is liable for substantive crimes commit-
ted during the course of the conspiracy so long as he is a member of 
the conspiracy, i. e., has intentionally entered into the conspiratorial 
agreement with the intent that its objectives be achieved. Other than 
agreement, no other act by the non-participating defendant is required; 
whereas under JCE I some affi rmative act that actually furthers the 
purpose of the enterprise is a necessary pre-requisite for attribution.
In other cases, however, where criminal liability is attributed verti-
cally, up a chain of command, JCE attribution is broader because for 
JCE liability to occur, a defendant need not necessarily ratify the enter-
prise’s purpose so long as his acts further it. The necessity of proving 
the intent to enter into a conspiratorial agreement thus serves to limit 
attribution under Pinkerton in these cases. 
Moreover, conspiracy more closely comports with the principal of 
culpability since it punishes, as a substantive crime, participation in 
group activity whereas JCE expressly does not. Ultimately, the analysis 
reveals the apparent need in international criminal law for a theory 
which directly punishes participation in an organization which commits 
crimes, rather than approximating such punishment by attributing lia-
bility for crimes via JCE to defendants who played no role in them. 
Criminal law provides for ways to attribute criminal liability to individuals 
other than those who perform all the acts necessary to the completion of the 
crime on the justifi cation that such attribution is necessary because signifi cant 
wrongdoers would otherwise go unpunished.1 However, punishing wrongdo-
ers as to whom criminal liability has been attributed, rather than those who 
are directly responsible, arguably violates one of the fundamental principles of 
criminal law that punishment should refl ect culpability. Since at least the 18th 
C, the cornerstone for assessing appropriate punishment in the common law le-
gal systems has been the defendant’s culpability (criminal intent or mens rea). 
Culpability is the measuring stick by which the appropriate degree of punish-
ment is calibrated. It is seen as a continuum of awareness from negligence to 
1 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Judgement ICTY Appeals Chamber, at para. 191, Case No. IT-94-1-A 
(July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadić Appeal Judgement].
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recklessness to knowledge to intent with the degree of punishment paralleling 
this continuum from the least serious for negligent conduct to the harshest for 
intentional conduct. Theories that attribute criminal liability to those other 
than the principal authors of the crime can contradict the principle of culpabi-
lity since individuals who do not intend to commit crimes, or even know that 
crimes have been committed, may be among those most seriously punished.2 
Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) liability, which has its roots in Prosecutor 
v. Tadić, the fi rst case decided by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), is one such theory.3 The criticisms of JCE – inter 
alia that it lacks a solid doctrinal foundation, that it overlaps and confl icts with 
the doctrines of complicity and superior responsibility, or that it over punishes 
some and under punishes others – are well documented in the literature and it 
is not my purpose to rehash those arguments.4 
Instead, I propose to compare JCE and American conspiracy law as theo-
ries for attributing criminal liability in an attempt to determine whether JCE 
more accurately attributes guilt and comports with the principle of culpability 
than American conspiracy law. This analysis will focus on the Tadić case in 
the ICTY and Pinkerton v. United States5 in the U.S. Supreme Court. These 
two cases established the doctrines of criminal attribution for which they have 
come to stand and, despite the criticisms of them,6 the basic principles remain 
substantially the same today as they did when the cases were decided.7
Joint Criminal Enterprise
In Tadić, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY faced a dilemma. Tadić had 
been acquitted by the Trial Chamber of some of the most serious crimes with 
which he was charged, the murders of fi ve individuals in the Jaskići and Sivic 
areas of opština Prijedor. His participation in those crimes did not amount 
2 See Ronald C. Slye and Beth Van Schaack, ESSENTIALS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
293 (2009).
3 Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enter-
prise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 Cal.
L.Rev. 75, 147 (2005) [hereinafter Guilty Associations]:
… JCE, has the potential to push the boundaries of the traditional criminal law paradigm, 
particularly with respect to the mens rea and culpability principles that are central to criminal 
law. In general, offenses committed with a high level of intent or purposefulness are viewed as 
more serious and morally blameworthy than offenses committed recklessly or negligently.
4 See, e.g., Guilty Associations, supra note 3 and Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and 
Command Responsibility, 5 J. of Int’l. Crim. Justice 159 (2007) (hereinafter, Ambos).
5 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
6 Supra note 4.
7 See, e.g., Ambos, supra note 4 at 160.
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either to direct perpetration,8 complicity (aiding and abetting),9 or superior re-
sponsibility,10 the rules found in the ICTY statute for attributing to individuals 
the responsibility for international crimes. Absent another theory of individual 
responsibility, the Trial Chamber’s decision would have to stand. Consequent-
ly, the Appeals Chamber searched for and found what it deemed to be a theory 
of customary international law11 that justifi ed Tadić’s conviction. The theory 
was “common purpose” liability,12 which the Tadić court said “encompasses 
three distinct categories of collective criminality.”13 I will briefl y describe the 




The most basic, and least controversial, form of JCE liability is the com-
mon enterprise/shared common intention category (JCE I).14 The Tadić Ap-
peals Chamber described JCE I as, 
where all co-defendants, acting pursuant to a common design possess the 
same criminal intention; for instance, the formulation of a plan among the 
co-perpetrators to kill, where, in effecting this common design (and even if 
each co-perpetrator carries out a different role with it), they nevertheless all 
possess the intent to kill.15
8 Direct perpetration is planning, instigating, ordering or committing. Security Council of 
the U.N., Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, at art. 7(1), 
U.N. Doc. S/res/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
9 ICTY Statute at art. 7(1) (“otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or 
execution of a crime”).
10 ICTY Statute at art. 7(3).
11 Tadić Appeal Judgement, at paras. 194-95. The Tadić Appeals Chamber’s conclusion that 
the third category of JCE (JCE III) is customary international law has been criticized by commen-
tators. See, e.g., Guilty Associations, supra note 3 at 110 (“The cases cited in Tadić … do not sup-
port the sprawling form of JCE, particularly the extended form of this kind of liability, currently 
employed at the ICTY.”) and Kai Ambos, Amicus Curiae Brief in the Matter of the Co-Prosecu-
tors’ Appeal of the Closing Order Against Kaing Guek Eav “Duch” dated 8 August 2008, 20 Cri-
minal Law Forum 353, 385-86 (2009), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/1046-
8374/20/2-3/. More recently, one of the post-ICTY tribunals, the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia, has rejected that conclusion. Prosecutor v. Ieng, et. al., Decision of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber on the Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal 
Enterprise (JCE), at para. 77, Case No. 002-19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38) (May 20, 2010), 
available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/fi les/documents/courtdoc/D97_15_9_EN.pdf.
12 Tadić Appeal Judgement, at para. 195.
13 Id.
14 See Ambos, supra note 4 at 160.
15 Tadić Appeal Judgement, at para. 196.
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 This form of JCE could not have supported a fi nding that Tadić had par-
ticipated in the murders. While the evidence proved that he “actively took part 
in the common criminal purpose to rid the Prijedor region of the non-Serb 
population,” and that it was “beyond doubt” that he was “aware of the killings 
accompanying the commission of inhumane acts against the non-Serb popula-
tion,”16 evidence of awareness (knowledge) was insuffi cient to prove beyond a 




The second category of JCE liability – the “systemic” form17 – is not rele-
vant to the facts in Tadić,18 and it will not be the subject of this article because 
it has no analogue under Pinkerton. However, a brief description is warranted. 
This form of liability is derived from the concentration camp cases where, in 
order to establish the liability of the camp commander for individual crimes 
committed by the prison guards, the prosecution must prove:
(i) the existence of an organized system to ill-treat detainees and commit 
the various crimes alleged; (ii) the accused’s awareness of the nature of the 
system; and (iii) the fact that the accused in some way actively participated 
in enforcing the system, i.e., encouraged, aided and abetted or in any case 
participated in the realization of the common criminal design.19
JCE II requires knowledge of the result (criminal ill treatment of prisoners) 
and some affi rmative act of participation in the enterprise. JCE II could not 
solve the problem the Tadić Appeals Chamber faced because, most obviously, 
the crimes did not take place in a prison camp setting, and there was no evi-
dence that Tadić occupied a superior position vis à vis those who committed 
the murders. So the Tadić court had to look even further, venturing onto what 
some believe was entirely new territory,20 where it found JCE III. 
16 Tadić Appeal Judgement, at para. 231.
17 Tadić Appeal Judgement, at paras. 203-203; Ambos, supra note 3 at 160.
18 Tadić, Appeal Judgement, at para. 203.
19 Tadić, Appeal Judgement, at para. 202.
20 See supra note 11 and Ambos, supra note 4 at 173 (“… JCE II and III constitute new and 
autonomous (systemic) concepts of imputation without an explicit basis in written international 
criminal law.“)
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JCE III
The third category of JCE, the “so-called ‘extended’ joint enterprise,” 21 
exists where one of the co-actors commits a crime not within the scope of the 
common plan but which constitutes a “natural and foreseeable consequence” 
of the execution of the plan.22 The Tadić Appeals Chamber gave an example 
of JCE III that was eerily similar to the facts in Tadić itself. It posited a hypo-
thetical common plan to ethnically cleanse a village during which one or more 
of the villagers was killed. While killing civilians was not part of the plan, “it 
was nevertheless foreseeable that the forcible removal of civilians at gunpoint 
might well result in the deaths of one or more [of them].”23 
Here, unlike JCE I or JCE II, attribution of criminal liability for the mur-
ders is cut loose from the mens rea requirements of intent to produce, or even 
knowledge of, the result. Instead criminal attribution rests on the more elastic 
negligence concept of foreseeability.  No wonder ICTY prosecutors have used 
JCE as a theory of liability so frequently;24 it relieves them to a substantial 
degree of their burden of proof and exposes defendants to punishment for the 
most serious offenses on proof arguably amounting to little more than simple 
negligence.25 
The Tadić Appeals Chamber would dispute this analysis. It tried to allay 
fears that JCE III could impose maximum liability for minimum culpability 
when it stated: 
It should be noted that more than negligence is required. What is required 
is a state of mind in which a person, although he did not intend to bring 
about a certain result, was aware that the actions of the group were most 
likely to lead to that result but nevertheless willingly took that risk. In other 
words, the so-called dolus eventualis is required (also called ‘advertent 
recklessness’ in some legal systems).26
Despite these reassuring words, the Appeals Chamber’s statement none-
theless amounts to an argument that recklessness is a suffi cient mens rea for 
imposing maximum punishment, a position that runs counter to accepted prin-
21 Ambos, supra note 4 at 160.
22 Tadić Appeal Judgement, at para. 204.
23 Id.
24 One study showed that from its genesis in Tadić until 2004, JCE was alleged in 64% of 
the ICTY indictments. If “acting in concert” is added as a theory for attributing liability, the 
total rises to 81%.  Guilty Associations, supra note 3 at 107.
25 Id. at 108-09.
26 Tadić Appeal Judgement, at para. 220.
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ciples of culpability.27 As for whether the standard really requires dolus even-
tualis, suffi ce it to say that drawing the line between negligence and reckless-
ness is not always easy. Likewise, imposing criminal punishment based on the 
conduct of others often produces less than satisfactory results, especially if the 
results are to be judged by the measuring stick of whether the punishment fi ts 
the crime. 
Next, I will outline the basic principles of American conspiracy law. 
Conspiracy
 
Conspiracy has deep roots in the common law. Like solicitation and at-
tempt, conspiracy was aimed at crime prevention, punishing inchoate crimes, 
even though the actors’ criminal objective was not fulfi lled.28 But unlike its 
common law ancestor, in modern American law conspiracy does not disappear 
when the object offense is completed.29 It remains as a substantive offense, 
punishing the criminal agreement on the theory that joint criminal activity is 
more dangerous than individual activity and therefore warrants more punish-
ment.30 
In addition to deterring and punishing crime, conspiracy is the basis for a 
rule of evidence that permits the use out-of-court statements of co-conspirators 
as exceptions to the hearsay rule.31 Conspiracy also permits the attribution of 
liability for a substantive offense committed by one co-conspirator to other, 
non-participating co-conspirators.32 It is this last use of conspiracy doctrine, as 




At common law, conspiracy was defi ned as an agreement between two or 
more persons to commit an unlawful act or to commit a lawful act unlawful-
27 Supra note 3 and accompanying text.
28 Beth Van Schaack and Ronald C. Slye, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCE-
MENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 867 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that “the original purpose of conspiracy 
doctrine … was to deter preparatory criminal activity”).
29 Id.
30 Id. (“[C]onspiracy should be criminalized … to diffuse the danger associated with group 
criminality.”)
31 F.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
32 Joshua Dressler, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 493 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter 
Dressler];Van Schaack and Slye, supra note 26. 
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ly.33 The essence of the offense is the unlawful agreement.34 Common law con-
spiracies were punished as misdemeanors, even if no act in furtherance of the 
criminal purpose had taken place.35 Since no act, other than the agreement, is 
required for conviction, the intent of the putative co-conspirators is especially 
important. Indeed, conspiracy is one of the few “double” specifi c intent (dolus 
specialis) offenses. Thus, the co-conspirators must: 1) intend to enter into the 
conspiratorial agreement with 2) the specifi c intent to accomplish the object of 
the conspiracy.36 This intent requirement, by defi nition, limits those offenses 
which can be the objects of conspiracies to intentional offenses; that is to say, 
one cannot intend to commit a negligent or reckless crime. So, for example, 
some courts hold that only fi rst degree murder, which requires premeditation 
and deliberation in addition to intent to kill, can be the object offense of a con-
spiracy to commit murder.37 In this sense, the mens rea/culpability required for 





All of the co-conspirators must enter into the same criminal agreement.  
[T]he agreement takes the law beyond the individual mental states of the 
parties, in which each person separately intends to participate in the com-
mission of an unlawful act, to a shared intent and mutual goal, to a spoken 
or unspoken understanding by the parties that they will proceed in unity 
toward their shared goal.38
33 Id. at 429.  Conspiracies of the second type where the objective is the commission of a 
lawful act unlawfully are rare and of dubious validity. See id. at 437-38. The Model Penal Code 
requires that the object of the conspiracy be a criminal offense. American Law Institute, Model 
Penal Code (1962) § 5.03 [hereinafter MPC].
34 Dressler, supra note 33 at 434.
35 There are statutory conspiracies that do require the commission of an overt act in further-
ance of the conspiracy; e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 making it an offense to conspire to commit an 
offense against, or defraud, the United States. The manual for U.S. federal prosecutors lists the 
elements of a Section 371 conspiracy as “including an illegal agreement, criminal intent, and 
proof of an overt act.” 9 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, Criminal Resource Manual 923.
36 Dressler, supra note 33 at 440.
37 See, e.g., People v. Cortez, 960 P.2d 537, 538 (Cal. 1998).
38 Dressler, supra note 33 at 434. As a consequence, at common law there was no such thing 
as a unilateral conspiracy; that is, one could not enter into a conspiracy with an undercover po-
lice offi cer because the offi cer does not intend to carry out the conspiratorial agreement. Id. at 
446. The Model Penal Code adopts the unilateral approach. MPC, Comment to § 5.03 at 393.
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Thus, the term conspiracy properly refers to the criminal agreement and 
not, as it is often misused by lawyers and judges, to the group of conspirators.39 
Consider this example. A and B agree to rob a bank. At the scene of the crime, 
C renders some assistance. C has aided and abetted the commission of the of-
fense of bank robbery, but is C also a co-conspirator? If conspiracy is taken 
to mean the “group of conspirators,” then arguably he is because he aided and 
abetted the “group,” making him guilty of the additional crime of conspiracy. 
This analysis would, however, be wrong. C can be a co-conspirator only if he 
participated in the formation of the agreement or ratifi ed it later on. Since C 
did not participate in the agreement, or even know of its existence, he is not 
guilty of conspiracy.
Finally, it is clear that a single agreement can encompass the commission 
of more than one crime. As the Supreme Court stated in Braverman v. United 
States,40 “one agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements and hence 
several conspiracies because it envisages the violation of several statutes rather 
than one.”41 This rule sounds simple but can present problems in application. 
For example, if A and B steal a car, it may reasonably be inferred that they did 
so pursuant to an agreement. But what if a week later A and B steal a second 
car? Is that theft a part of the original conspiracy, in which case A and B are 
guilty of one conspiracy and two car thefts, or is it a separate conspiracy, in 
which case they are guilty of two conspiracies and two car thefts. The answer 
depends upon the nature of the original conspiratorial agreement. Was it to 
steal cars? Or to steal ONE car? The issue may be further complicated if the 
object crimes are dissimilar, e.g., a week after the theft of the second car, A 
and B burglarize a house to steal the owner’s property. Now are they guilty of 
one conspiracy encompassing three substantive crimes; one conspiracy encom-
passing two substantive crimes and one conspiracy encompassing one substan-
tive crime; or three conspiracies, each encompassing a separate substantive 
crime? The answer depends upon the nature of the conspiratorial agreement.
 
The Parties to a Conspiracy
 
Conspiracy is an offense that requires the participation of more than one 
person. Accordingly, Wharton’s Rule provides that an offense which by defi ni-
tion requires the participation of two persons cannot be the object of a con-
39 Dressler, supra note 33 at 436-37. I owe Professor Dressler for the example which fol-
lows in the text. 
40 Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942).
41 Id. at 53.
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spiratorial agreement.42 This is because in those offenses, such as bribery, the 
parties do not share the same criminal purpose – one is a bribe giver, the other 
is a bribe taker. On the other hand, when more than two participate in the 
crime, such as when A and B agree to bribe C, a conspiracy to commit bribery 
can exist. For the same reason, if the only two parties to the alleged conspiracy 
are the defendant and an undercover police offi cer, no conspiracy exits because 
the undercover offi cer never intends to commit the object offense.43
More complicated scenarios involve situations where one conspiracy is 
charged but more than one conspiratorial agreement is proved. Some older 
U.S. Supreme Court cases focused on this single versus multiple conspiracy 
issue. Kotteakos v. United States44 involved a so-called wheel conspiracy. In 
that case, Brown was a broker who arranged for fraudulent loans to thirty-one 
different recipients who belonged to eight different groups.45 Brown and the 
other thirty-one individuals were charged with being members of a single con-
spiracy. There was no evidence that the individuals in the eight groups were 
aware of each others’ existence or that they all had obtained their fraudulent 
loans through Brown.46 
The prosecution in Kotteakos argued that all the conspirators were con-
nected by virtue of their common link, Brown, the “hub” of the wheel.47 The 
defendants countered that there could be no single conspiracy unless the spokes 
– the eight groups – were also connected by a rim; that is, some evidence that 
there was a necessary relationship between the groups. The Supreme Court 
agreed with the defense that in Kotteakos each fraudulent loan agreement 
stood on its own and that there was no relationship between the spokes.48 In 
other words, there was no community of interest, and no shared or common 
objective. Instead, there was merely parallel conduct by the eight groups who 
were similarly situated.  
Of course the fact that there was not a single conspiracy does not mean that 
there was no conspiracy.  In Kotteakos, each of the eight spokes of the wheel 
constituted a separate “chain” conspiracy.49 Indeed, it is possible to have a sin-
gle conspiracy that has characteristics of both a wheel and a chain. That would 
have been the case in Kotteakos, if there had been a community of interest and 
shared common objective – a rim – tying together the spokes in the wheel.50 
42 Dressler, supra note 33 at 461.
43 Id. at 440.
44 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
45 Id. at 754-55.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 755.
48 Id.
49 Dressler, supra note 33 at 455.
50 Id. at 455-56.
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Putting aside the different images used to describe conspiracies, a basic 
point should be underscored: It is not fatal to the existence of a conspiracy 
that some of the conspirators have never communicated with each other or 
that they know of each other’s existence, so long as the evidence reveals that 
the conspirators have an awareness of “both the scope and the objective of 
the enterprise”51 and that there is a shared “community of interest [among the 
parties].”52 However, “[m]ere knowledge of illegal activity, even in conjunction 
with participation in a small part of the conspiracy, does not by itself establish 
that a person has joined in the grand conspiracy.”53
Whether there is one or more than one conspiracy is not just a question for 
academic curiosity. It can have considerable consequences. For example, it can 
affect whether the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule applies54 or 
whether the defendants may be properly joined together for trial.55 However, 
the consequence which is of central importance in this article is whether guilt 
for crimes committed by a co-conspirator may be attributed to the other mem-
bers of the conspiracy. If there is a single conspiracy, such attribution can take 
place. If there are multiple conspiracies, it cannot.
 
“Pinkerton” Liability
In Pinkerton v. United States, two brothers, Daniel and Walter, were charged 
with tax violations stemming from unlawful possession, transportation and 
dealing in whiskey.56 There was no question that the brothers were properly 
convicted of conspiracy. The issue was whether Daniel could be convicted of 
substantive offenses committed by Walter while Daniel was in jail.57 As to the 
substantive offenses, there was also no question that they furthered the con-
spiracy since many of them were also charged as overt acts.58 In deciding that 
Daniel had been properly convicted of the substantive offenses, the Supreme 
Court said: 
51 United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663,670 (10th Cir. 1992).
52 Dressler, supra note 33 at 454, quoting Kilgore v. State, 305 S.E.2d 82, 90 (Ga. 1983).
53 United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d at 670. (The Evans court rejected the government’s con-
tention that knowledge that cocaine came from the Medellin cartel could make a street dealer a 
member of the worldwide Medellin conspiracy.)
54 F.R.Evid., Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
55 F.R.Crim.Pro., Rule 8(a).
56 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. at 648 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 642.
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The unlawful agreement contemplated precisely what was done. It was 
formed for the purpose. The act done was in execution of the enterprise. 
The rule which holds responsible one who counsels, procures, or commands 
another to commit a crime is founded on the same principle. That principle 
is recognized in the law of conspiracy when the overt act of one partner in 
crime is attributable to all.59
The Court noted, however, that it would be a “different case” if the substan-
tive offenses committed by one of the conspirators were not “in furtherance of 
the conspiracy, did not fall within the scope of the unlawful project, or [were] 
merely a part of the ramifi cations of the plan that could not be reasonably 
foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.”60 
Since none of those factors was present in Pinkerton, this last statement by 
the Court was obiter dictum, not binding in subsequent cases.61 Nonetheless, 
it is the foundation for a substantial body of U.S. case law attributing criminal 
liability to co-conspirators on the grounds that the crimes were “reasonably 
foreseen as a natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.”62  
The Two Theories Compared
Attribution of Criminal Liability: JCE I and Conspiracy
 
While attribution of liability for crimes committed by a JCE requires the 
existence of a common plan or purpose, the Tadić court made it clear that 
“[t]here is no necessity for the plan, design or purpose to have been previ-
ously arranged or formulated.”63 It “may materialize extemporaneously and be 
inferred from the fact that a plurality of persons acts in unison…”64 Once the 
enterprise comes into existence, whether by prior plan or extemporaneously, 
all the members of the enterprise are responsible for its crimes so long as they 
59 Id. at 647. Justice Robert Jackson, the chief Nuremberg prosecutor who was on leave 
from the U.S. Supreme Court at the time Pinkerton was decided, criticized it on his return to 
the Court as a theory of criminal attribution resting “upon the novel and dubious theory that 
conspiracy is equivalent in law to aiding and abetting.“ Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 
440, 451 (1949) (Jackson, J. concurring).
60 Id. at 647-48.
61 Note, Developments in the Law – Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 994 
(1959).
62 Dressler, supra note 33 at 494 (cautioning that many of the cases adopting Pinkerton 
could have reached the same result using principles of accomplice liability).
63 Tadić Appeal Judgement, at para. 227 (iii).
64 Id.
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perform “acts (of any kind) that ‘in some way’ are directed to the furthering of 
the common plan or purpose.”65 
Courts and commentators have seized on the “participation” requirement 
as the factor that distinguishes JCE from conspiracy and presumably narrows 
the circumstances in which criminal liability may be attributed.66 But, as we 
shall see, this is at best only partially true.
The common law required only an agreement in order for the conspirators 
to be guilty of the substantive crime of conspiracy.67 In cases of “pure” agree-
ment, however, conspiracy does not function as a rule of attribution. This is 
because, when conspiracy is used as a rule of attribution, at least one substan-
tive crime (other than the conspiracy itself) must have been committed by one 
of the co-conspirators.68 Thus, conspiracy attribution occurs when: 1) the de-
fendant enters into the conspiratorial agreement, and 2) a crime is committed 
by any of the co-conspirators, and 3) the crime is one of the explicit objectives 
of agreement.
Would the outcome be any different under JCE I? In both JCE I and con-
spiracy there is a common criminal purpose, whether we label it enterprise 
or agreement.69 And, under both theories the defendant to whom liability is 
attributed must have had the specifi c intent that a crime that is explicitly part 
of the common criminal purpose be carried out. That leaves only the nature of 
the defendant’s participation (the actus reus) as a basis for distinction. 
In a common law conspiracy the defendant’s “act” would be agreeing to par-
ticipate in the conspiracy. In a JCE I every defendant must act “in some way” that 
contributes to the common plan. Thus, the question boils down to: Does “agree-
ing” in and of itself satisfy the participation requirement for a JCE? 
“Mere agreement, [as] to a single specifi c object” is suffi cient for Pinkerton 
liability to attach.70 By comparison, while “the precise threshold of participa-
tion in JCE has not been settled,”71 it is obviously higher than “mere agree-
ment”: 
65 Ambos, supra note 4 at p. 171, quoting Tadić Appeal Judgement, at para. 229.
66 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milutinović, et. al., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion 
Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72 (May 21, 
2003), available at http://www.icty.org/x/fi le/Legal%20Library/jud_supplement/supp41-e/mi-
lutinovic-a.htm [hereinafter Milutinović Appeal Decision].
67 Supra note 35 and accompanying text.
68 Courts frequently overlook this distinction. See, Note, New Frontiers in the ATS: Con-
spiracy and Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability after Sosa, 28 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 619, 628-29 
(2010).
69 See, Milutinović Appeal Decision.
70 Note, Developments in the Law – Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 996 
(1959).
71 Prosecutor v. Kovčka, et. al., ICTY Trial Chamber Judgement, at para. 289, Case No. 
IT-98-307/1 (November 2, 2001); see also, Ambos, supra note 4 at 171.
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The participation of the accused in the common purpose is required, which 
involves the perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute. 
This participation need not involve commission of a specifi c crime under 
one of the provisions (for example murder, extermination, torture or rape), 
but may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of 
the common purpose.72 
Thus, for attribution to occur in a JCE the defendant’s act must actually as-
sist in or contribute to the “execution of the common purpose,” whereas under 
Pinkerton “merely agreeing,” while doing nothing to carry out the agreement, 
would be enough. It follows that in this situation attribution under conspiracy 
theory is broader than it would be in a JCE. 
In either case, however, attribution presents little danger of imposing liabili-
ty in excess of culpability. Under either JCE I or conspiracy, all of the defen-
dants must intend that the object crime of the JCE/conspiracy be committed 
and that crime is committed. Thus, there is no unfairness in punishing a de-
fendant because a crime that he intended was committed by another member 
of a group to which he belonged. Indeed, one might legitimately ask whether 
in the limited circumstance where JCE I attribution does not occur, it actually 
under punishes the agreeing, but non-participating, members. 
 
Vertical Attribution of Criminal Liability: JCE III v. Pinkerton
 
Vertical attribution of criminal liability takes place when the criminal or-
ganization is hierarchical. In these instances, those at the top of the hierarchy 
do the planning and issue the orders and those at the bottom carry them out. 
And, while those at the bottom bear the greater direct responsibility for the 
commission of the crimes, those at the top reap the greatest benefi t.
Neither the Tadić Appeals Chamber nor the Pinkerton Court considered 
the implications of vertical attribution of criminal liability.73 The later ICTY 
cases have applied JCE theory to hierarchical organizations also without con-
sidering whether the theory was suited for that purpose.74 This article will 
consider how JCE III and Pinkerton attribute liability vertically and in those 
cases which theory imposes the more expansive form of liability. 
72 Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Appeal Judgement, at para. 100, Case No: IT-98-32-A (February 
25, 2004); see also, Milutinović Appeal Decision.
73 Cf. Guilty Associations, supra note 3 at 109.
74 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgement, at para. 150, Case 
No. IT-98-33-A (April 19, 2004) [hereinafter Krstić Appeal Judgement].
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Soldiers in regular army units may commit war crimes but their offi cers are 
not also automatically held responsible. In order for liability to be attributed 
back up the chain of command, in the ICTY the prosecution will be required 
to prove either: 1) that the offi cers directly participated in (usually by ordering) 
the commission of crimes;75 or 2) that the offi cers were liable under the theory 
of command responsibility;76 or 3) that the soldiers and their commanding of-
fi cers are members of a JCE. It is only the last of these three forms of liability 
that is within the scope of this article.
Tadić set out the elements that must be proved to establish membership in 
a JCE III. There is a participation element77 – the members of the group must 
assist in or contribute to the execution of the plan78 – and a mens rea element 
– “the intention to participate in and further the criminal activity or crimi-
nal purpose of a group or in any event to the commission of a crime by the 
group.”79 In most, if not all cases, whether the prosecution proves the mens rea 
element will depend on the defendant’s conduct because “[i]n practice, the sig-
nifi cance of the accused’s participation will be relevant to demonstrating that 
the accused shared the intent to pursue the common purpose.”80 But what kind 
of proof is suffi cient to establish “the intention to participate in and further the 
criminal activity or criminal purpose of a group or in any event to the commis-
sion of a crime by the group”?81
In using the term “intention,” the Tadić Appeals Chamber cannot have 
meant “the intent to perpetrate a certain crime,” 82 otherwise the mens rea for 
JCE I and JCE III would be identical, rendering JCE III superfl uous. What, 
then, did it mean? An analysis of the facts and reasoning in Tadić suggests the 
answer. 
The facts supporting Tadić’s membership in a JCE were: 1) he was “an 
armed member of an armed group;” 2) the armed group attacked the village of 
Jaskići and Tadić “actively took part in this attack, rounding up and severely 
75 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaškić, ICTY Trial Chamber Judgement, at para. 495, Case No. 
IT-95-14-T (March 3, 2000).
76 ICTY Statute, art. 7(3).
77 The participation element is the same for all three forms of JCE. Only the mens rea ele-
ment changes. Tadić Appeal Judgement, at paras. 227-28. 
78 It should be noted that in Tadić, JCE was not alleged in the indictment as a basis for the 
defendant’s liability for the murders in Jaskići nor was it relied upon by the prosecution during 
trial. The court inferred the common criminal purpose – “ to rid the Prijedor region of the non-
Serb population by committing inhumane acts” – “from the evidence adduced and accepted.” 
Tadić Appeal Judgement, at para. 231.
79 Tadić Appeal Judgement, at para. 228.
80 Prosecutor v. Kovčka et al., ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgement, at para. 97, Case No. 
IT-98-30/1-A (Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Kovčka Appeal Judgement].
81 Tadić Appeal Judgement, at para. 228.
82 Id.
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beating some of the men;” 3) the armed group was violent, beating some of the 
men from the village “into insensibility[] as they lay on the road” and threaten-
ing witnesses with death as the men were being taken away; and 4) fi ve men, 
who had been alive, were found dead, after the armed group, including Tadić, 
had left the village.83 From this evidence the Appeals Chamber concluded: 
[T]he only possible inference to be drawn is that the Appellant had the 
intention to further the criminal purpose to rid the Prijedor region of the 
non-Serb population, by committing inhumane acts against them. That 
non-Serbs might be killed in the effecting of this common aim was, in the 
circumstances of the present case, foreseeable. The Appellant was aware 
that the actions of the group of which he was a member were likely to lead 
to such killings, but he nevertheless willingly took that risk.84
Thus, the mens rea proving membership in a JCE III amounts to member-
ship in a group plus intentional participation in the group’s activities with an 
awareness of the risk that the group’s actions are likely to result in the commis-
sion of a crime.85 In order for a crime that was not expressly part of the group’s 
plan86 to be attributed to a member of the group under JCE III, the defendant 
must in addition have taken that risk willingly.87 When these pre-requisites are 
met, attribution occurs regardless of the hierarchical position of the defen-
dant in the group. In other words, criminal liability is shared equally by all the 
members of the group.88 
The pre-requisites for attribution under conspiracy theory are different and 
can produce different results. On facts similar to Tadić’s, attribution would 
not have occurred under Pinkerton, most obviously, because there was no 
evidence of any pre-existing plan. While that is not fatal to the existence of a 
JCE,89 it is the essential requirement of a conspiracy.90 Without evidence that 
an alleged conspirator had entered into the agreement, no criminal liability for 
83 Tadić Appeal Judgement, at paras. 180-83, 231-32.
84 Tadić Appeal Judgement, at para. 232.
85 See Ambos, supra note 4 at 168 (“Thus his liability [under JCE III] is essentially based 
on his membership in the group pursuing the JCE.”)
86 Tadić Appeal Judgement, at para. 231.
87 Krstić Appeal Judgement, at para. 150, Case No. IT-98-33-A (April 19, 2004) (“It is suf-
fi cient to show that he was aware that those acts outside the agreed enterprise were a natural 
and foreseeable consequence of the agreed joint criminal enterprise, and that the accused par-
ticipated in that enterprise aware of the probability that other crimes may result.”)
88 Ambos, supra note 4 at 173 (“While some judgments … try to take into account the role 
and function of the accused in the enterprise, there still exists a tendency to render all partici-
pants equal on the level of attribution.”)
89 Tadić Appeal Judgement, at para. 227.
90 Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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substantive crimes committed by him may be attributed to the co-conspirators, 
whether such crimes were expressly part of the agreement (JCE I) or merely a 
reasonably foreseeable of it (JCE III).
It is possible, however, to infer adherence to a prior conspiratorial agreement 
based on the conduct of the putative conspirators.91 So it might be that in cases 
like Tadić, where there is no explicit proof of an agreement, the conduct of the 
co-conspirators could suffi ce to establish the existence of one.92 Such conduct 
proves membership in the conspiracy only if it demonstrates an awareness of, 
and the specifi c intent to participate in, the prior conspiratorial agreement.93 If, 
however, the conduct proves only that a person provided substantial assistance 
to the conspiracy without entering into the agreement, then that person is not 
a co-conspirator because aiding and abetting a conspiracy is not possible.94 By 
contrast aiding and abetting a JCE is.95 In order to see how these differences in 
theory play out in practice, I will analyze some hypothetical examples.
First, assume that there is evidence that the commanders of a regular army 
military unit agreed to ethnically cleanse an area that they planned to attack. 
That agreement is to be carried out by orders issued to subordinates and passed 
down the chain of command. In order for liability for the reasonably foresee-
able crimes committed by the soldiers carrying out the orders to be attributed 
to their superiors via Pinkerton, the soldiers must be parties to the prior con-
spiratorial agreement, i.e., they must be co-conspirators. But are they? It seems 
to me that if adherence to the agreement is proved only by the conduct of a 
subordinate who carries out a superior’s order, such evidence will always be 
inherently ambiguous – does it prove the subordinate’s adoption of the agree-
ment or merely that he is following orders? 
Dražen Erdemović’s testimony in the Krstić trial nicely demonstrates this 
point.96 Erdemović was a member of the Drina Corps that was involved in the 
military operation at Srebrenica. Prior to July 15, 1995, Erdemović’s unit had 
been involved with the assault on Srebrenica and the rounding up of civilians. 
He was also involved in providing security for Generals Mladić and Krstić 
when they entered the town on July 11. Ordinarily, his unit was tasked with 
sabotage. On the morning of July 15th, Erdemović and his unit were ordered to 
Branjevo farm. On arriving, the following transpired: 
91 Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
92 Dressler, supra note 33 at 434-35.
93 Id.
94 Supra note 39 and accompanying text.
95 Ambos, supra note 4 at 170-71 (observing that “JCE III … constitutes only a form of 
aiding and abetting the JCE”).
96 Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33, Proceedings of May 22, 2000, Testimony of 
Dražen Erdemović, available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krsitc/trans/en/000522it.htm.
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Brano came back to us and told us that buses would come with civilians 
from Srebrenica on them. And I and some others started objecting, saying, 
‘What are we going to do there?’ And he said that we would have to execute 
those people. In the course of this debate, the fi rst bus was already arriving. 
This may have been 20 minutes later or half an hour later. So the fi rst buses 
came in about half an hour, as he had said. When the fi rst bus arrived – I 
know about myself; I don’t know exactly about the others, what they said – I 
said that I did not want to do that, that I cannot do that, that that is not the 
task of our unit. Brano told me then, ‘If you won’t do it, stand up with them 
or give them your rifl e, and you will see whether they will shoot you.’97
Thereafter, Erdemović and the other members of his unit formed a fi ring 
squad that executed between 1000 and 1200 civilians by shooting them in the 
back. This evidence clearly establishes Erdemovć’s membership in a JCE. He 
was a member of the group and he intentionally participated in its activities 
with an awareness of its common purpose. It does not, however, prove that he 
was a co-conspirator because he clearly did not agree with his superiors’ plan 
to kill civilians, and therefore his actions in conformity with the plan do not 
prove agreement. Thus, his crimes could not be attributed to his superiors via 
Pinkerton.
There is another hypothetical scenario in which the results produced by 
application of the two doctrines might differ. Assume that the superiors agree 
to ethnically cleanse an area but issue orders that explicitly forbid killing ci-
vilians. Despite that, the members of a unit that is part of the command carry 
out the order by killing civilians. In a JCE, will liability for those killings be 
attributed back up the chain of command simply because, as the ICTY has 
repeatedly said, killing civilians is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of an 
ethnic cleansing plan? The answer to that question is almost certainly “yes.” 
These facts are almost identical to those in Krstić where the Appeals Cham-
ber held that it was proper to attribute liability for “opportunistic“ crimes to 
Krstić despite that fact that he had issued orders that civilians were not to be 
harmed.98
The question is considerably closer if conspiracy theory is applied to these 
facts. It is certainly possible that a court could fi nd that that the conduct of the 
unit in so enthusiastically achieving the avowed purpose of ethnic cleansing 
(even in violation of orders) proves adherence to the agreement. On the other 
hand, violation of orders could also be viewed as a disavowal of the agreement 
and evidence of the formation of a separate conspiracy, in which case attribu-
tion back up the chain of command would not occur.
97 Id. at pp. 3124-25.
98 Krstić Appeal Judgement, at para. 149.
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Then there is also the question of reasonable foreseeability. If the com-
manders have specifi cally forbidden certain conduct, can its subsequent occur-
rence be deemed “reasonably” foreseeable? This depends upon whether rea-
sonable foreseeability is an objective standard, i.e. foreseeable by a reasonable 
person in the defendant’s position, or a subjective standard, i.e., foreseeable 
to the defendant. The jurisprudence of the ICTY provides no clear guidance 
on this question99 and the law in the United States is probably no better.100 
Addressing the question of attribution of liability for reasonably foreseeable 
crimes in a JCE II, the Kovčka Appeals Chamber seemed to say that the stand-
ard is subjective:
[P]articipation in a systemic joint criminal enterprise does not necessarily 
entail criminal responsibility for all crimes which, though not within the 
common purpose of the enterprise were a natural or foreseeable conse-
quence of the enterprise. A participant may be responsible for such crimes 
only if the Prosecution proves that the accused had suffi cient knowledge 
that such crimes were a natural and foreseeable consequence to him.101
If the standard is subjective, then there is a stronger argument that crimes 
committed in contravention of orders are not reasonably foreseeable to the 
defendant-superior offi cer. Nonetheless, and while not specifi cally addressing 
this point, the Krstić Appeals Chamber’s fi nding of responsibility for crimes 
the defendant had expressly prohibited is at least an implicit rejection of the 
subjective standard in the JCE III context.102
Conclusions
 
I hope this article has demonstrated that there are theoretical and practical 
differences between conspiracy and JCE liability for substantive offenses and 
that its analytic framework has provided a different perspective on the role that 
attribution of criminal liability plays in jurisprudence of the ICTY.  
There is probably little disagreement that attribution is appropriate when 
there is shared intent as to specifi c criminal offenses. And, even though the 
possibility for attribution is somewhat greater using conspiracy theory, such 
as where there is only an agreement and a crime committed by one of the 
99 See Guilty Associations, supra note 3 at 106.
100 See Note, Developments in the Law – Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 996 
(1959).
101 Kovčka Appeal Judgement, at para. 86.
102 Krstić Appeal Judgement, at para. 149.
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conspirators, without any additional participation by the others, since all of the 
conspirators share the same mental state, none of them is punished in excess 
of culpability.103 
Both JCE and Pinkerton work less well the larger and more hierarchical 
the organization becomes. In these instances, the risks of running afoul of 
the principle culpability are greatest. Conspiracy theory does make vertical 
attribution of criminal liability somewhat more diffi cult, and it at least has the 
virtue of recognizing the danger of group criminality by punishing the de-
fendant separately for his participation in the conspiracy. Conspiracy liability 
thus more closely refl ects actual culpability, which is for membership in the 
criminal enterprise and not the commission of crimes by others. By contrast, 
JCE III, which is not a form of enterprise liability,104 uses the blunt instrument 
of attribution to approximate the defendant’s culpability for participating in 
group criminality.
That aside, the greatest weakness of both JCE III and Pinkerton is that 
reasonable foreseeablilty imposes no real limit on a defendant’s liability for 
unintended crimes.105 An enterprise’s common purpose can be and, often is, 
articulated quite broadly; for example, “to rid the Prijedor region of the non-
Serb population, by committing inhumane acts [against them]”106 or “ to rid the 
Prijedor area of Muslims and Croats as part of an effort to create a unifi ed Ser-
bian state.”107 In such circumstances, “does the requirement of foreseeability 
have any limiting power? Or, in a situation of mass violence or armed confl ict, 
are all international crimes foreseeable? 108
Conspiratorial agreements can also be expansively worded. However, some 
U.S. courts have shied away from overly expansive attributions of liability via 
Pinkerton, recognizing the danger of offending due process.109 There is no evi-
dence that similar constraints exist in the ICTY where prosecutors sometimes 
103 Moreover, such cases are very rare. Indeed, Pinkerton is the only one I have found.
104 Milutinović Appeal Decision.
105 Guilty Associations, supra note 3 at 135 (“As a practical matter, prosecutorial discre-
tion appears to be the only meaningful limit on the extent of wrongdoing attributable to an 
individual defendant in JCE.“)
106 Tadić Appeal Judgement, at para. 231.
107 Kovčka Appeal Judgement, at para. 45.
108 Van Schaack & Slye, supra note 29 at 827.
109 “The extension of co-conspirator liability to ‘reasonably foreseeable but originally un-
intended substantive crimes’ must be limited by due process as Alvarez realized. Thus, Alva-
rez’s holding is limited to conspirators ‘who played more than a ‘minor’ role in the conspiracy, 
or who had actual knowledge of at least some of the circumstances and events culminating in 
the reasonably but unintended substantive crime.’” 
United States v. Mothersill, 87 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 1996), quoting United States v. 
Alvarez,755 F.2d 830, 851n. 27; see also, United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 818 (10 Cir. 
2000).
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do not even plead JCE,110 and it is often the court that articulates the all encom-
passing common purpose of the enterprise.111 This disparity in approach has 
been summed up this way:
[S]everal U.S. courts have recognized that Pinkerton conspiracy, which 
closely resembles Category Three JCEs because both are predicated on 
foreseeable but unintended crimes, poses problems of fundamental fairness 
in cases where the link between an individual’s wrongdoing and criminal 
liability is highly attenuated. The judges at the ICTY, by contrast, have not 
yet provided any elaboration on the defi nition of the term “enterprise” in 
JCE. Unlike domestic conspiracy theories, then, JCE lacks formal limita-
tions and safeguards.112
 
One potential solution is to punish enterprise liability directly, rather than 
indirectly by attribution of criminal liability for substantive offenses. As the 
United States faced threats posed by criminal organizations, like the Italian 
Mafi a, the Colombian drug cartels and al Qaeda, the inadequacies of con-
spiracy theory became apparent. These criminal enterprises were organiza-
tionally too complex to fi t neatly within the concept of a single conspiracy 
whose purpose was the commission of a discrete list of crimes. Moreover, the 
organizations were intentionally structured to take advantage of these weak-
ness in order to insulate their leaders, who were the most responsible and the 
most culpable, from punishment.
Beginning in the 1960’s, Congress responded to these perceived doctrinal 
weaknesses by passing statutes with catchy names, like the Racketeer Infl u-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),113 which were designed to tar-
get and dismantle criminal organizations and punish their leaders. The cor-
nerstone of this approach was punishing individuals for their participation in a 
criminal enterprise rather than for crimes committed by others.114 While I am 
not recommending RICO as a model, this article has demonstrated the need 
for some form of enterprise liability in international criminal law. 
Enterprise liability is no stranger to international criminal law. Conspiracy, 
as a tool to punish membership in criminal organizations, was used in the post-
110 Kovčka Appeal Judgement, at paras. 42-43 (holding that JCE must be pleaded but up-
holding the conviction on ground that defendant received adequate notice by other means).
111 See, e.g., Tadić Appeal Judgement, at para. 231; see also, Guilty Associations, supra 
note 3 at 142 (concluding that “international judges have almost invariably elected the most 
expansive interpretation of the [JCE] doctrine”). 
112 Guilty Associations, supra note 3 at 140-41.
113 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et. seq.
114 Id. at § 1962.
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-World War II cases against the Nazis.115 Following that, conspiracy largely 
disappeared from international criminal law, only to re-emerge in the juris-
prudence of the ICTY reformulated as JCE.116 Unfortunately, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) statute does not address enterprise liability, although it 
does contain a rule of attribution similar to JCE.117 How that rule will be in-
terpreted remains to be seen. But it is unlikely that the ICC could construe its 
statute as providing for a form of enterprise liability without running afoul of 
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.118 
And, even if it could fashion such a rule, the Tadić and Pinkerton cases 
illustrate that courts are ill suited to the task of devising rules which function 
well outside of the context of the specifi c facts on which they are based. Let 
us not forget that it is the Tadić case which created the status quo – punishing 
group membership indirectly through attribution of liability for substantive 
criminal offenses. Ultimately if the ICC is denied the tools to properly cali-
brate punishment for crimes based on membership in a criminal organization, 
then a statement made by Judge Hunt of the ICTY in a different context could 
apply equally to it: “This Tribunal will not be judged by the number of convic-
tions which it enters . . . but by the fairness of its trials.”119
115 Guilty Associations, surpa note 3 at 113-14.
116 Id. at 117-18.
117 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at art. 25(d), U.N. Doc 
A/Conf. 183/9 (1998), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/0D8024D3-87EA-
4E6A-8A27-05B987C38689/0/RomeStatutEng.pdf.
118 In Prosecutor v. Stakić, ICTY Trial Chamber Judgement, at para. 433, Case No. IT-97-
37-AR72 (May 21, 2003), the Trial Chamber stated that “joint criminal enterprise cannot be 
viewed as membership in an organisation because this would constitute a new crime not fore-
seen under the Statute and therefore [would] amount to a fl agrant infringement of the principle 
nullum crimen sine lege.” 
119 Prosecutor v. Milosević, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Admissibility of 
Evidence in Chief in the Form of Written Statements, ICTY Appeals Chamber, at para. 22, 
Case. No. IT-02-54-AR73.4 (Oct. 21, 2003).
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Summary
PRETPOSTAVKE ZA KAZNENU ODGOVORNOST: 
KRITIČKA USPOREDBA DOKTRINE O “ZLOČINAČKOJ UROTI” 
(CONSPIRACY) U PRAVU SAD TE DOKTRINE 
MEĐUNARODNOG KAZNENOG SUDA ZA BIVŠU SFRJ 
O “ZAJEDNIČKOM ZLOČINAČKOM POTHVATU” 
(JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE) IZ AMERIČKE PERSPEKTIVE
U svom prvom slučaju, Žalbeno vijeće Međunarodnog kaznenog suda za bivšu Jugosla-
viju suočilo se s teškoćom procesuiranja tipa grupnog djelovanja koje je rezultiralo masov-
nim zločinima za vrijeme rata na području bivše Jugoslavije. Strogo primjenjujući načela za 
utvrđivanje kaznene odgovornosti iz Statuta MKSJ, Raspravno vijeće oslobodilo je Tadića od 
najtežih optužbi, ubojstva pet osoba koja su se dogodila tijekom etničkog čišćenja sela Jakšići. 
Žalbeno vijeće u predmetu Tadić otklonilo je problem razrađujući doktrinu zajedničkog 
zločinačkog pothvata (ZZP), za koju je utvrdilo da je dio međunarodnog običajnog prava koje 
je obuhvaćeno u okviru Statuta MKSJ-a.
U dva od svoja tri oblika – ZZP I (zajednička namjera) i ZZP III (proširena odgovornost 
za razumno predvidljive zločine) – ZZP sliči na odgovornost za samostalna kaznena djela 
počinjena tijekom zločinačke urote (conspiracy). Takozvana Pinkertonova odgovornost temelji 
se na predmetu o kojem je odlučio Vrhovni sud Sjedinjenih Država 1946. godine, i iako se 
Žalbeno vijeće nije oslonilo posebno na predmet Pinkerton kao izvor za svoju odluku, sličnosti 
između dva slučaja su očite.
Svrha ovog članka, i predavanja na kojemu se temelji, jest usporediti dvije doktrine da bi 
se utvrdilo kako one određuju kaznenu odgovornost i koja se bolje slaže s načelom krivnje; 
odnosno kažnjavanje okrivljenika u kaznenom postupku na temelju njegova psihičkog stanja 
(mens rea) u vrijeme počinjenja djela. Postignuti zaključci bili su mješoviti.
Čini se da Pinkerton šire utvrđuje odgovornost nesudjelujućih okrivljenika u nekim 
slučajevima zajedničke namjere od ZZP I. To je zato što je okrivljenik odgovoran za samostal-
na kaznena djela počinjena tijekom zločinačke urote dok god je član zločinačke urote, tj. stupio 
je u urotnički dogovor s namjerom da se ostvare njezini ciljevi. Osim dogovora, ne traži se niti 
jedan drugi čin nesudjelujućeg okrivljenika; dok je prema ZZP I određeni afi rmativni čin koji 
stvarno pridonosi svrsi pothvata nužna pretpostavka za kaznenu odgovornost. 
U drugim slučajevima, gdje se kaznena odgovornost utvrđuje vertikalno, po zapovjednom 
lancu, kaznena odgovornost po ZZP-u je šira, jer za nastanak odgovornosti po ZZP-u okriv-
ljenik ne treba nužno pristati na svrhu pothvata dok god joj njegovi čini doprinose. Nužnost 
dokazivanja namjere za stupanje u urotnički dogovor stoga služi za ograničenje kaznene odgo-
vornosti prema Pinkertonu u ovim slučajevima.
Štoviše, zločinačka urota više se slaže s načelom krivnje budući da kažnjava, kao samostal-
no kazneno djelo, sudjelovanje u djelovanju grupe, dok ZZP izrijekom ne. Konačno, analiza 
otkriva očitu potrebu u međunarodnom kaznenom pravu za teorijom koja izravno kažnjava 
sudjelovanje u organizaciji koja čini kaznena djela, umjesto aproksimiranja takvog kažnjavanja 
utvrđivanjem odgovornosti za zločine preko ZZP-a okrivljenicima koji nisu sudjelovali u nji-
ma.

